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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Now, as a nation, we don’t promise equal outcomes, but we were 
founded on the idea everyone should have an equal opportunity to 
succeed.”1 
 
In June of 2017, the European Commission levied the largest 
competition fines in its history against tech giant, Google.2  The 
Commission ruled that Google was unlawfully taking advantage of its 
position as the preeminent search engine in Europe to buoy another one 
of its businesses by automatically placing search results from its price-
comparison site, Google Shopping, at the top of user product searches.3  
 
*J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law. The author would like to 
thank Professor David Opderbeck for all of his helpful feedback and notes and 
Professor Narjan Peters for her help selecting the topic.  
 1  President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President at College 
Opportunity Summit (Dec. 4, 2014) (Transcript available at https://obamawhite 
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/04/remarks-president-college-
opportunity-summit).  
 2  Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google 
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance (June 27, 2017). 
 3  Id. 
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On the day the fines were announced, Margrethe Vestager, the EU’s 
Commissioner for Competition, explained the reasoning behind the fines 
in an interview with CNBC.4  In her explanation, Vestager focused on 
Google’s “dominance” of the search engine market and its use of this 
dominance to manipulate the internet price-comparison market in favor 
of Google Shopping.5  According to Vestager, the fines were levied to 
protect market competition.6  Challenging her reasoning, CNBC host 
Sara Eisen questioned whether Google should be punished for taking the 
steps necessary to succeed against the likes of Amazon and eBay.7  While 
Eisen’s rebuttal was a simple one, it is indicative of the different 
approaches taken by the United States and the European Union in 
addressing tech companies’ bias in favor of their own products and lateral 
businesses.8 
Since the beginning of the decade, the European Commission has 
challenged Google to comport with European laws enacted to prevent 
dominant companies from using their position to further profit 
themselves in other areas.9  In contrast, the United States has done next 
to nothing to maintain a level playing field, particularly for search 
engines, which are utilized daily by a majority of American internet 
users.10 
The European laws on which the Commission’s decision was based, 
namely Article 102 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union 
and Article 54 of the Agreement on European Economic Area (“EEA 
Agreement”), are competition laws similar to American antitrust 
statutes.11  Both seek to prevent parties, particularly those in a position to 
dominate their market, from artificially reducing or handicapping 
 
 4  Maragrethe Vestager, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager_en (last viewed on Feb. 2, 2019) 
(As the EC’s Competition Commissioner, Vestager is responsible for “enforcing 
competition rules in the areas of antitrust, cartels, mergers, and state aid”). 
 5  Interview by Sara Eisen with Margrethe Vestager, European Competition 
Commissioner (Jun. 27, 2017). 
 6  Id. 
 7  Id. 
 8  Id. 
 9  Leo Keion, Google hit with record EU fine over Shopping service, BBC (Jun. 
27, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40406542.  
 10  Amanda DiSilvestro, Who Uses Search Engines? 92% of Adult U.S. Internet 
Users [Study], SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Aug. 11, 2011), https://searchengine 
watch.com/sew/study/2101282/search-engines-92-adult-internet-users-study  
 11  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115/47; Agreement on the European Economic Area, March 
17, 1993, O.J. No. L 1,3.1994. 
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competition to the detriment of consumers.12  Despite these similarities, 
American government agencies charged with enforcing competition laws 
have been unwilling to take action against such violations, with that of 
Google being the primary example.13  This can be most obviously seen in 
the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) decision not to bring action 
against Google for biasing its searches to benefit its other business 
ventures, such as Google Shopping.14 
Using the European Commission’s action against Google as a case 
study, this note will examine whether a market-dominant search engine 
(in this case, Google) is permitted under U.S. law to give preferential 
search treatment to its collateral businesses, despite the potential harm to 
the market and consumers.  The next section will examine, in greater 
detail, the Commission’s investigation into Google’s practices, its 
eventual ruling and justifications for it, and the United States’ history of 
inaction against Google for providing preferential searches to its users.  
The following section will examine whether or not American law allows 
for a successful claim in a theoretical case against Google, and later 
possible laws that could be implemented or actions that could be taken to 
reform American antitrust law for the purposes of creating a more 
balanced market for all competitors.15 
II. BACKGROUND OVERVIEW 
This section will discuss the European Commission’s decision to 
fine Google a record €2.42B for abuse of its market dominance as well 
as the statutes that formed the basis of that decision.16  It will also discuss 
how the European Commission’s action in this area has diverged from its 
American counterparts, namely the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”).17 
 
 12  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115/47; Agreement on the European Economic Area, March 
17, 1993, O.J. No. L 1,3.1994. 
 13  See generally, Memorandum from [Redacted] to FTC (Aug. 8, 2012) 
(regarding the FTC’s pending decisions to bring charges against Google for their use 
of search biases). 
 14  Id. 
 15  The scope of this examination will be limited to anti-trust statutes and case 
law. 
 16  Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google 
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance (June 27, 2017). 
 17  Memorandum from [Redacted] to FTC (Aug. 8, 2012). 
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A. European Commission’s Investigations of Google (November 
2010–June 2017) 
Price-comparison site, “Google Shopping” (known first as 
“Froogle”), was established in December of 2002.18  The site allows 
consumers to compare prices of similar or identical products from 
different sources, providing them with the most cost-effective search 
results.19  Entering into a market with established brand names, the 
fledgling site struggled, leading one internal memo at Google to assert 
that “Froogle simply doesn’t work.”20 
Between 2008 and 2013, Google began adapting its search results 
across Europe, as it did in the United States, in two major ways.21  First, 
Google increased the exposure of Google Shopping by placing price 
comparisons from the site at the top of searches of Google’s main search 
engine (google.com) for applicable products.22  After placing price 
comparison results linked to Google Shopping at the top of Google 
searches, web traffic to Google Shopping skyrocketed and increased the 
site’s advertising revenue.23  Additionally, Google altered its algorithms 
to force rival price comparison websites out of the immediate view of 
Google search users.24  By forcing results of its competitors’ home pages 
on to subsequent Google search result pages, Google reduced users views 
of these sites exponentially.25  European Commission surveys indicate 
that web traffic to links on the first page of Google’s search results 
account for ninety-five percent of all users, while the first link on the 
second page accrues one percent.26  By employing these practices, 
 
 18  Google Launches Shopping Site, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE (Dec. 






 19  Id.  
 20  Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines Google 
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage 
to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017). 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines Google 
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage 
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Google hampered competitors’ ability to compete.27 
In response to the reaction of competing price-comparison websites, 
the Commission opened proceedings against Google in November  
2010.28  The Commission’s announcement stated, in part,  that the 
Commission would investigate “whether Google ha[d] abused a 
dominant market position in online search” in its promotion of Google 
Shopping and demotion of rival sites.29  Such actions, the Commission 
asserted, violate European anti-competition law.30  In addition, the 
Commission also included several other potential violations related to 
Google’s discrimination against rival businesses in its advertisements, 
including claims that Google had misused its phone software to the 
detriment of competitors.31 
Reaching a “preliminary conclusion” on the illegality of Google’s 
practices in March of 2013, Google and the European Commission 
discussed potential methods to bring Google into compliance with 
European antitrust laws.32  Google proposed placing links from Google 
Shopping within a distinguishable frame, while noting that the 
information was “promoted” by Google and modifying its algorithm to 
increase competitors’ visibility.33  In February of 2014, Google increased 
its offer by assuring the Commission that it would make at least three 
links to competitive price-comparing websites visible in searches where 
Google Shopping links were promoted.34  While the agreement 
temporarily alleviated the Commission’s concerns, the Commission 
reinstituted its proceedings against Google, as well as parent company 
Alphabet, on July 14, 2016.35 
 
to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017). 
 27  European Commission Fact Sheet IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission fines 
Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal 
advantage to own comparison shopping service – Factsheet (Jun. 27, 2017). 
 28  Id. 
 29  Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Probes 
Allegations of Antitrust Violations by Google (Nov. 30, 2010). 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Seeks 
Feedback on Commitments Offered by Google to Address Competition Concerns 
(Apr. 25, 2013).  
 33  Id. 
 34  Press Release, European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission 
Obtains from Google Comparable Display of Specialized Search Rivals (Feb. 5, 
2014). 
 35  Vice President Joaqin Almuia, Statement at the Midday press briefing on 
Commission’s Statement of Objections sent to Microsoft (Feb. 5, 2014); European 
Commission Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Takes 
Further Steps in Investigations Alleging Google’s Comparison Shopping and 
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After nearly a year of further investigation, the European 
Commission’s inquiry into Google’s search biases came to an end.36  In 
a published memoranda, the Commission asserted that Google “abused 
its market dominance as a search engine by giving an illegal advantage 
to another Google product.”37  In its decision to fine Google, the 
Commission focused on the company’s “market dominance” in the 
search engine market across all thirty-one countries within the European 
Economic Area (“EEA”).38  The Commission asserted that Google had 
controlled around 90 percent of the market share for general internet 
searches since 2008, when it first adopted its volatile search bias 
practices.39  Since Google adopted these practices, the Commission had 
observed an exponential increase in web traffic to Google Shopping.40  
Since 2008, Google Shopping had increased traffic by about 45,000 
percent in the United Kingdom, 35,000 percent in Germany, 19,000 
percent in France, 29,000 percent in the Netherlands, 17,000 percent in 
Spain, and 14,000 percent in Italy.41  During that same period, the 
Commission identified that price comparison websites competing with 
Google Shopping experienced decreases in web traffic as high as 92 
percent in some countries.42 
However, such patterns have not been limited to Europe, as they 
have also gained traction in the United States, where Google’s practices 
of promoting Google Shopping and demoting its rivals were also 
implemented.43  According to the FTC, between July of 2007 and 2008, 
Google Shopping skyrocketed from the seventh-most-trafficked price 
comparison site to the most-trafficked such site.44 
 
Advertising-Related Practices Breach EU Rules (July 14, 2016); Press Release, 
European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to 
Google on Comparison Shopping Service; Opens Separate Formal Investigations on 
Android (April 15, 2015). 
 36  European Commission Fact Sheet IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission fines 
Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal 
advantage to own comparison shopping service – Factsheet (Jun. 27, 2017). 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google 
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage 
to Own Comparison Shopping Service (Jun. 27, 2017). 
 41  Id.  
 42  Id.  
 43  Memorandum from [Redacted] to FTC (Aug. 8, 2012), 
https://www.benedelman.org/pdf/ftc-google-8aug2012.pdf (regarding the FTC’s 
pending decisions to bring charges against Google for their use of search biases). 
 44  See generally, Memorandum from [Redacted] to FTC (Aug. 8, 2012), 
https://www.benedelman.org/pdf/ftc-google-8aug2012.pdf. 
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The basis for the European Commission’s decision to fine Google 
came through two major laws: (1) Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, and (2) Article 54 of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) Agreement.45  According to the European 
Commission’s press release following its levying of Google’s fine, both 
of these laws govern antitrust violations for parties holding a “dominant 
position” in their market.46 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union 
(“TFEU”) was written as the bedrock document of the newly-established 
European Union.47  Article 102 requires that leading businesses do not 
abuse the power they wield in their given markets to prevent competition 
or use that power to unfairly muscle itself into other areas.48  Within its 
text, Article 102 provides examples of abuse within the Article’s text and 
includes unfair pricing, intentionally limiting production, and price 
gouging.49 
A violation of Article 102 occurs when: (1) the accused has a 
dominant market position, and (2) that dominant market position has been 
abused by the accused.50  To determine whether the accused holds a 
dominant market position, the Commission must agree on a precise 
definition of what the market is.  The Commission makes this 
determination by examining both the goods or services being provided, 
as well as the geographic parameters relevant in determining the 
competition against the accused.51  Once the parameters of the relevant 
market are established, factors such as market share (when over 40%), 
ease of entering into the market, and size and resources of the accused 
company factor into whether the business has a dominant market 
position.52  In this case, Google had acquired as much as 92% of the 
market share for search engines in EEA countries, achieving well over 
40% in each of the EEA’s 31 economic areas across Europe.53 
 
 45  Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google 
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage 
to Own Comparison Shopping Service (Jun. 27, 2017). 
 46  Id. 
 47  Antitrust: Overview, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu 
/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
 48  Id. 
 49  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115/47. 
 50  Antitrust Procedures in Abuse of Dominance (Article 102 TFEU cases), 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/procedures 
102_en.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google 
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The Commission considers whether the company took action to 
“distort” the competition in deciding whether the dominant company has 
abused its dominance in a given economic market.54  In its decision, the 
Commission ruled that Google used its dominant search engines to 
artificially promote its comparison-shopping website, at the expense of 
its competitors.55  As a result, Google’s actions constituted an abuse of 
its dominant power over the search engine market expressly forbidden by 
Article 102 of the TFEU, and violation of European anti-competition 
law.56 
The latter statute, Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, makes illegal 
any action taken by a dominant market player that may artificially affect 
trade in any way.57  Article 54 provides examples such as price gouging, 
limiting production of goods, and requiring other parties to make 
agreements unrelated to business in order to assure continued partnership 
with the dominant party.58  The statute covers many of the same anti-trust 
infractions as Article 102 of the TEFU and was itself used in the 
Commission’s claim against Google.59  Once again, by using its success 
to artificially prop up Google Shopping, its own vertical business, Google 
was found to have abused its dominant market position.60 
B. American Investigation into Google’s Search Bias Practices 
Not long after the European Commission began its investigation of 
Google’s search applications, the United States’ consumer protection 
agency, the FTC, began its own investigation into Google’s alleged 
search biases.61  In a complaint against the company, several price-
comparing sites raised the issue of Google’s favoritism towards Google 
 
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage 
to Own Comparison Shopping Service (Jun. 27, 2017). 
 54  Antitrust Procedures in Abuse of Dominance (Article 102 TFEU cases), 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/ 
procedures_102_en.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Agreement on the European Economic Area, March 17, 1993, O.J. No. L 1, 
3.1994. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Press Release, European Union, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 
Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to 
Own Comparison Shopping Service (Jun. 27, 2017). 
 60  Id. 
 61  Vauhini Vara, Were Google’s Practices Anti-Competitive or Just Anti-
Competitor, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 21, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com 
/business/currency/were-googles-practices-anti-competitive-or-just-anti-
competitor.  
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Shopping to the FTC.62  For two years, the FTC delved into Google’s 
promotion of its own products and demotion of its competitors.63  As part 
of the investigation, the FTC interviewed employees of Google and its 
competitors, while also conducting searches of its own to learn the extent 
of the affect that these practices had on Google Shopping’s competitors.64 
Ultimately, the FTC prepared an internal report in which it decided 
not to bring formal action against Google, either under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act or Section 5 of the FTC Act.65  In the FTC’s 
judgment, Google’s practices were not designed to harm competitors.66  
Rather, just as Sara Eisen put it in her CNBC interview with Margrethe 
Vestager, Google took such action as a means of making its universal 
search engine a more efficient product to better compete in a crowded 
field.67  By placing direct links to Google Shopping at the top of searches 
for products, Google allowed for the streamlining of a user’s 
experience.68  According to the FTC’s determination, this structure would 
allow customers to accomplish their search goals more efficiently.69  To 
the FTC, Google’s actions served as “legitimate product improvements,” 
and found no official wrongdoing in Google’s placement of Google 
Shopping.70 
III. ANALYSIS – AMERICAN LAW AND FAIR SEARCH RESULTS 
A. Search Bias and American Law 
This section will examine whether American law would allow for 
the regulation of search biases in its current state.  While appearing to be 
based on the same logic and steps as EFEU Section 102 and Article 54 of 
the EEA Agreement, U.S. the current bulwark of American anti-trust law, 
Sherman Antitrust Act,  does not appear to provide the government with 
the authority to stop Google from promoting its business over 
competitors.71  The Sherman Antitrust Act is the law most likely to be 
 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id.  
 65  Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search 
Practices, In the Matter of Google Inc., (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov 
/system/files/documents/public_statements/295971/130103googlesearchstmtofcom
m.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
 66  Id.  
 67  Id.  
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115/47; Agreement on the European Economic Area, March 
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employed by the FTC in such a case against Google.72  The Sherman Act 
is broken into two major sections: Section 1 of the Act is largely focused 
on precluding collusion between two or more parties to assure success in 
a given market, while Section 2 places more focus on unilateral actions 
taken by a single party to hamper competition.73  Since it does not appear 
that Google took action with the assistance of any other party or entity, 
the FTC will likely bring its action under Section 2 of the Act.74 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act establishes three different offenses that 
can be brought against defendants: (1) “monopolization,” (2) “attempted 
monopolization,” and (3) “conspiracy to monopolize.”75  Section 2 has 
previously served as the bedrock of anti-competition claims brought in 
federal court, including those involving major technology companies.76  
In United States v. Microsoft Corporation,77 a landmark case before the 
D.C. Court of Appeals, the federal government brought action against 
blue-chip computer giant Microsoft.  The government alleged that 
Microsoft violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by creating a monopoly 
of computer operating systems and conspired to monopolize internet 
browsers in the midst of the tech boom at the turn of the millennium.78 
The case came at the end of a series of actions by competitors against 
Microsoft spanning much of the 1990s.79  The series of cases swirled 
around Microsoft’s ground-breaking “Windows” operating system and 
its automatic installation on personal computers, or “PCs,” which had 
begun to garner the ubiquitous presence in homes that they maintain to 
this day.80  Before the D.C. Circuit on appeal was whether Microsoft’s 
control of the operating system software market with its Windows 
operating system was the result of “monopolization” banned under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.81 
 
17, 1993, O.J. No. L 1,3.1994. 
 72  The Antitrust Laws, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Feb. 2, 
2019). 
 73  Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise. . .is hereby declared illegal”); William F. Adkinson, Jr., et al., 
ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 2-3 
(Federal Trade Commission, 2008). 
 74  15 U.S.C. § 2 (2019). 
 75  15 U.S.C. § 2 (2019); William F. Adkinson, Jr., et al., ENFORCEMENT OF 
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 2-3 (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2008). 
 76  See United States. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 77  Id. at 45. 
 78  Id. at 47. 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. 
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To establish whether Microsoft engaged in illegal monopolization, 
the D.C. Circuit employed the two-part test first formulated in United 
States v. Grinnell Corp.82  To sustain a claim for a violation of Section 
2’s monopolization prohibition, the Grinnell test requires that: (1) the 
defendant corporation possesses a monopoly in the “relevant market” in 
question; and (2) this monopoly was maintained through the company’s 
misuse of that monopoly power, rather than through acceptable means, to 
control the market.83 
To establish the existence of Microsoft’s operating system 
monopoly, the court first set out to ascertain the definition of two of the 
first factor’s operative terms: “monopoly power” and “relevant 
market.”84  Although the Supreme Court in United States v, E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co. asserted that a party’s ability to manipulate the price 
of its goods beyond their competitors’ ability to participate established a 
monopoly, later cases ruled the monopoly power may be inferred by 
showing a “dominant” share of the product’s “relevant market.”85 
In defining what constitutes a “relevant market,” the court in 
Microsoft took a relatively narrow approach.86  Based on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in du Point, the court considered  only those products 
which are “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same 
purpose.”87  Greatly impacting Microsoft’s market power, the court 
limited the relevant market to operating systems running on Intel 
processors, thus rendering Apple’s OS operating system and 
“middleware” out of the scope of market definition.88  Leaving out both 
of these operating systems out of the relevant market left Windows with 
a ninety-five percent share of the defined market, which the court deemed 
sufficient to prove monopoly power.89 
Since the presence of a monopoly in itself does not establish 
monopolization claim, the court in Microsoft examined whether or not a 
 
 82  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 50. 
 83  United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966) (“(1) the possession 
of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident”). 
 84  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 85  Id. (citing Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 
1995)). 
 86  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 52. 
 87  United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) 
(examining Section 2 monopolization claims against defendant’s cellophane 
business). 
 88  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 52-54. 
 89  Id. at 52-58; See also Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571 (ruling that 87% market 
share is sufficient for monopoly power). 
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monopoly was obtained through conduct that could be deemed exclusory 
to other members of the relevant market.90  Determining whether the 
defendant has acted in an anti-competitive manner is established through 
a four-factor, shifting-sands test established in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. 
McQuillan.91  To prove anti-competitiveness, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate: (1) the defendant’s actions had a negative impact on the 
“competitive process” and (2) that the harm sustained was meant to be 
prevented under the statute.92  After meeting these two factors, the 
defendant is (3) given the opportunity to provide justification for its 
actions, after which (4) the onus returns to the plaintiff to establish that 
the harm pales in comparison to their “pro-competitive” benefits.93 
In its own examination, the court in Microsoft, citing previous cases, 
asserted that “courts are properly skeptical about claims that competition 
has been harmed by a dominant firm’s product design changes.”94  The 
court felt that ruling against certain design modifications would create a 
chilling effect on product innovation.95  By integrating Internet Explorer 
to Windows 95, Microsoft made it impossible to delete its web browser, 
which served as the default browser in certain situations.96  Competitors 
in the web browser market argued that having Internet Explorer 
integrated into ninety-five percent of the nation’s computers would limit 
consumer options and harm competition.97  Although it provided no such 
justification for why Microsoft precluded users from removing Internet 
Explorer from the software (in violation of Section 2), the D.C. Circuit 
Court deemed that the integration of Internet Explorer onto the Windows 
operating system, which then opened Internet Explorer automatically 
(despite the user’s choice of another default browser), did have relevant 
technical justifications.98  With Microsoft arguing that the default use of 
Internet Explorer would allow for a more user-friendly experience, which 
allowed “users to move seamlessly from local storage devices to the Web  
in the same browsing window.”99  Asserting that the government had not 
provided an adequate rebuttal to Microsoft’s pro-business argument, the 
court found that the integration of Internet Explorer into Windows to be 
 
 90  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58. 
 91  Id. at 52-58; Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993). 
 92  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58; Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 458. 
 93  Id. at 59. 
 94  Id. at 65 (citing Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 703 F.2d 
534, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 95  Id. at 65. 
 96  Id. at 64-65.  
 97  Id. 
 98  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 67.  
 99  Id. 
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a Section 2 violation.100  The D.C. Circuit came to a similar conclusion 
in examining Microsoft’s promotion of its own Java Virtual Machine 
(“JVM”) over the JVM produced by Sun Microsystems, which Microsoft 
made incompatible with Internet Explorer.101  The court, once again 
found that the pro-competitive nature of the promotion of its own product 
superseded the negative impacts placed on Sun Microsystems and the 
market and therefore was not a violation of monopolization laws.102 
After completing its discussion of monopolization, D.C. Circuit 
Court moved to claims of “attempted monopolization” under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act.103  Like the monopolization test, the Supreme Court 
in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan established a three-part test for 
finding the existence  Section 2 attempted monopolization, requiring that 
plaintiff: (1) establish that the defendant participated in “predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct”; (2) sought to create a monopoly; and (3) had a 
“dangerous probability” of obtaining such a monopoly.104  Honing in on 
plaintiff’s claims that agreements between Microsoft and main rival 
Netscape would give Microsoft a monopoly of the web browser market, 
the Circuit Court found that Microsoft had a “dangerous probability” of 
monopolizing the web browser market and overturned the lower court’s 
ruling.105 
Within the “dangerous probability” factor of the larger Spectrum 
Sports attempted monopolization test, a plaintiff must first show that the 
market it claims the defendant is attempting to monopolize can, in fact, 
be monopolized by a single entity.106  To do so, a plaintiff has to (1) 
establish the relevant market to be monopolized, and (2) show that 
“substantial barriers” limit the entry of competition.107  Quickly 
dismissing plaintiff’s attempted monopolization claim, the court held that 
the parties did not properly establish the relevant market that Microsoft 
sought to monopolize.108 
The court found no need to seek clarification of the definition for the 
market or to remand the case back to the lower court, repeating plaintiff’s 
responsibility for establishing such a definition to demonstrate a 
 
 100  Id. 
 101  Id. at 74-75. 
 102  Id. at 75. 
 103  Id. at 80; 15 U.S.C. § 2 (“Every person who shall . . . attempt to 
monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”). 
 104  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 80 (citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 
506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993)). 
 105  Id. at 80. 
 106  Id. at 81. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. 
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likelihood of monopolization in the future.109  The court asserted that the 
government also fell short in establishing the “significant barriers” to 
enter into the market.110  Standing alone, the government’s failure to 
define the monopolized market was sufficient to dismiss the claim of 
monopolization.111  Additionally, the government was unable to show the 
barriers erected by Microsoft gave them “the ability to lessen or destroy 
competition in that market,” the standard set forth in Spectrum Sports to 
determine the requisite difficulty of entry, or that Microsoft would control 
such power as to make it impossible to enter into the market.112  Despite 
the plaintiff’s argument that such a purchase would have for Microsoft 
amounted to a significant barrier, asserting that it would create a 
preference for Microsoft among users in the absence of any recognizable 
alternative, the court found such findings insufficient to establish an 
insurmountable barrier.113  As the Spectrum Sports test  is conjunctive, 
the D.C. Circuit Court reversed the lower court’s decision in favor of the 
plaintiff without discussing the merits of the first two factors.114 
The court in Microsoft provides an important, tech-based example 
of how American courts would likely rule on Section 2 monopolization 
and attempted monopolization claims involving Google’s search biases.  
In this case, it is likely that Google’s promotion of Google Shopping 
would be reasonably interpreted as procompetitive.  With limited barriers 
preventing parties from entering into field on the internet, a claim of § 2 
monopolization and attempted monopolization claims against Google 
would not hold. 
To examine a potential claim of monopolization in this case, a court 
would first return to the two-part monopolization test set forth in 
Grinnell.115  Although it would be difficult to conclude that Google 
Shopping ever had a monopoly in the saturated online price comparison 
market, it is irrefutable that Google holds a monopoly over the internet 
search engine market, a relevant market that the FTC defines narrowly as 
“[h]orizontal, algorithm web search.”116  As the Supreme Court in 
Grinnell established, and the court in Microsoft reinforced, monopoly 
 
 109  Id. at 81 (“we would normally remand this case . . . [a] remand on market 
definition is unnecessary, however, because the District Court’s imprecision is 
directly traceable to the plaintiffs’ failure to articulate and identify the evidence 
before the District Court . . . .”). 
 110  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 82. 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. at 82; Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). 
 113  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 82-83. 
 114  Id. at 81-82. 
 115  United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
 116  Memorandum from [Redacted] to FTC (Aug. 8, 2012) 
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power is often based on market share within the party’s relevant 
market.117  Research reports by web data analytics companies such as 
comScore indicate that Google represents 64 percent of the market share 
among desktop searches computers in February of 2016.118  This market 
share was much higher than any of Google’s competitors, with Bing, 
Yahoo, Ask, and AOL representing 21.4, 12.2, 1.7, and 0.9 percent of the 
market share respectively.119  While not rising to the levels seen in 
Microsoft (ninety-five percent), cases do support finding monopoly 
power in companies with similar market shares to Google.120  Based on 
these similar rulings, Google appears to hold a sufficient market share to 
be considered a monopoly, as it is the only company in their sector that 
controls more than twenty-five percent of the entire market.121 
Since the court would like find Google to have monopoly power, the 
court would move on the second Grinnell factor: whether intentionally 
skewing search results in favor of a company’s own vertical enterprises 
in the manner Google has would be considered monopolist.122  As seen 
in Microsoft, as well as the FTC’s previous dealings with Google, the 
deference paid by the courts and the FTC to design modifications and 
pro-competitive reasoning for the structure of a search engine’s results, 
would leave most claims of biased search results outside of what has 
previously been deemed “monopolistic” activity.123  For example, 
Google’s promotion of Google Shopping did not cause the FTC to pursue 
legal action under Section 2; they asserted that Google provided 
numerous pro-competition and design-based arguments that would have 
rebutted any claim of a monopoly and thus the FTC was unlikely to 
succeed in a legal proceeding.124 
In its argument before the Commission, Google asserted that 
 
 117  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 51. 
 118  Adam Lella, comScore Releases February 2016 U.S. Desktop Search Engine 
Rankings, COMSCORE (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.comscore.com/Insights/ 
Rankings/comScore-Releases-February-2016-US-Desktop-Search-Engine-
Rankings.   
 119  Id. 
 120  See Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir. 
1997) (holding that a company with 65 percent of the relevant market share had 
monopoly power). 
 121  Adam Lella, comScore Releases February 2016 U.S. Desktop Search Engine 
Rankings,, COMSCORE (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.comscore.com/Insights 
/Rankings/comScore-Releases-February-2016-US-Desktop-Search-Engine-
Rankings.  
 122  U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
 123  Memorandum from [Redacted] to FTC (Aug. 8, 2012). 
 124  Id. (regarding the FTC’s pending decisions to bring charges against Google 
for their use of search biases). 
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promoting its own vertical companies makes the search engine more 
efficient.125  The founder of Google, Sergey Brin, asserted that, by using 
Google’s main search engine to search for products, it is searching for 
results supported by Google, and the engine merely streamlines the 
process by staying on Google rather than jumping to another website.126  
Paired with several other arguments set forth to justify promotion of its 
own site, Brin’s statement provides evidence of the procompetitive intent 
behind the decision to promote Google Shopping.  According to prior 
case law, he is completely within his rights to take such actions in order 
to provide users with the most direct, streamlined experience possible.127  
When combined with the minimal cost the promotion of Google 
Shopping to consumers, rather than the competitors themselves, it 
appears that search engine biases are justifiable, and would not be 
considered monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
When examining a potential attempted monopolization of the online 
price-comparison market, courts will likely find, as they did in Microsoft, 
that there are insufficient barriers to entering the aforementioned 
marketplace to establish a claim for attempted monopolization.128  In 
attempting to establish Google’s ability to drive parties out of the market, 
it is quite clear that plaintiffs would run into a challenge based on the 
level of competition Google faces in the online price-comparison 
marketplace.  With regards to entering the market, the Microsoft court 
found that no significant barrier existed to enter the internet browser 
market, with limited overhead required to enter the market.129  With large 
companies like Microsoft also occupying prominent positions in the 
comparison search market, it seems unlikely that a court would find that 
Google has the market power to drive parties out.  With no evidence 
supporting an argument that Google could effectively use its power to 
dominate this market, it does not appear that a claim of attempted 
monopolization would be successful. 
Although Google’s search monopoly appears to be legal, with the 
configuration of Google’s searches benefiting Google Shopping arising 
out of a competitive desire to improve search efficiency for users, a 
potential plaintiff might attempt to attack Google’s search biases using a 
wrinkle in Section 2 monopolization law: the “refusal to deal.”130  Unlike 
 
 125  Id. 
 126  Id. 
 127  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 67. 
 128  Id. at 82; Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). 
 129  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 at 84. 
 130  1 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP., TR. & 
MONO § 4:21 (4th ed. 2017). 
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cases such as Microsoft where the defendant sought to obtain a large 
swath of the market it was in, other Section 2 monopolization claims deal 
with a company’s refusal to enter into agreements or interact with rival 
companies for the purpose of establishing or fortifying the former’s 
monopoly.131  A plaintiff may argue that Google’s movement of its 
competitors to subsequent search pages has no purpose other than to push 
for a monopoly in the price-comparison field, violating the spirit of the 
doctrine.  However, although earlier cases surrounding the refusal to 
agree may have benefitted such a claim, the presence of other search 
engines on the market and the Supreme Court’s recent expansion of the 
right of companies to refuse to deal with rivals, limits the prospects for 
any such claim against Google.132 
Cases under the refusal-to-deal method of reasoning began towards 
the turn of the century.133  Supreme Court’s first case in this line of 
decisions came in United States v. Colgate & Co., where plaintiff brought 
suit against defendant’s toiletries business for unlawful collusion.134  In 
this case, establishing a line reasoning similar to other Section 2 
monopolization claims, Justice James McReynolds established that 
businesses were free to choose to turn away business from whoever they 
pleased “[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a 
monopoly.”135  This case would be used to argue for unlawful refusal of 
business for much of the next century.136  The Supreme Court ceased to 
use the method after Aspen Skiing, Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 
in 1985.137  In Aspen, the defendant, an operator of three of Aspen’s four 
skiing mountains, refused to sell lift tickets to plaintiff, who was the 
operator of the final mountain.138  In addition, defendant ceased sales of 
multi-mountain passes which included the fourth mountain after the two 
parties disagreed over how to split the proceeds from the promotion.139  
 
 131  2-25 ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION §205.04 (2nd ed. 2012). See 
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (“In the absence of any 
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Antitrust] act does not 
restrict the long-recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely 
private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to the party 
with whom he will deal.”). 
 132  Verizon Comms., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004). 
 133  2-25 ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION §205.04 (4th ed. 2017).  
 134  Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
 135  Id. at 307. 
 136  See, Aspen Skiing, Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 
(1985). 
 137  Id. 
 138  Id. 
 139  Id. 
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The Court found the defendants in this case were in violation of Section 
2 of the Sherman Act, asserting that “attempting to exclude rivals on 
some basis other than efficiency” was deemed an anti-competitive act.140 
Despite these rulings, the Supreme Court greatly altered their 
viewpoint on company’s refusing to work their with competitors in the 
Court’s Verizon Communs., Inc. v. Trinko decision.141  This decision was 
born in the wake of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which set forth 
requirements that telecommunications providers share networks with 
companies seeking to move to their location.  The plaintiffs, a group of 
AT&T customers, claimed that Verizon, originally the only provider in 
their area, responded to service complaints from AT&T customers only 
after it answered such complaints from Verizon customers.142  In viewing 
Aspen Skiing more narrowly, the Court determined that “Verizon’s 
alleged insufficient assistance in the provision of service to rivals is not a 
recognized antitrust claim under the Court’s ‘refuse to deal’ 
precedents.”143 
Moreover, the Trinko case presents similar facts to the FTC’s 
potential suit against Google. As the facts apply to Google, Trinko 
demonstrates that such claims do extend to preferential treatment.144  The 
claim at issue in Trinko did not focus on a refusal to serve, but rather that 
Verizon was Preferencing its own product over the competitor’s 
product.145  The Trinko decision, similar to the Microsoft decision 
preceding it, allows companies to take action at the expense of rivals 
insofar that such action can be shown to accomplish a legitimate business 
interest.146  Since the FTC has explicitly mentioned that there are 
legitimate business interests of Google’s restructuring of its website–
mainly to promote Google Shopping–it would likely be deemed an 
acceptable means to improve the efficiency of user searches.  Thus, a 
claim brought on the grounds of duty of service would likely fall short 
once again.147 
B. A Potential Solution – Returning to the “Harvard” School of 
Antitrust Philosophy 
As Section 2 is currently enforced, configuring search engines to 
 
 140  Id. at 605. 
 141  Verizon Comuns., Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 142  Id. at 404-05. 
 143  Id. at 410. 
 144  Id. 
 145  Id. at 405. 
 146  Id. at 415-6. 
 147  Memorandum from [Redacted] to FTC 28 (Aug. 8, 2012). 
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produce search results biased towards the company’s own vertical 
companies appear to be within the bounds of American antitrust law.148  
Despite previously rulings’ appearance of support for such practice, the 
concept of search bias arguably offends the bedrock of the laws that 
provide little protection against it.149  This can be seen clearly in the 
history of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  The Act coincided with the 
dissolving of several major corporations, and was signed into law during 
a period of great industrialization in America.150  At the time, large 
businesses began purchasing every intermediate business necessary for 
the production of their goods.151  Doing so allowed these businesses to 
keep a stranglehold on their concentrated economic power.152  Born out 
of grassroots movements seeking to break up these trusts, the Sherman 
Act was signed into law with the goal of making products more affordable 
for consumers and wages more livable for workers.153  Although 
undoubtedly successful since its implementation, the court’s decision in 
Microsoft and subsequent cases seem to indicate the ability of modern 
technology to circumvent the Sherman Act and establish the type of 
artificial market control the Act seeks to eradicate.154  This conflicts with 
the basis for antitrust law, and action must be taken to prevent such 
practices that harm competition.  To correct this issue, courts could return 
to a more originalist interpretation of Section 2, one that recognizes the 
importance of protecting market competition.  However, this would be 
inconsistent with the current decisions regarding antitrust cases that 
consider a net-positive to consumers.155  The proven historical 
effectiveness of the originalist stance could return the enforcement of 
Section 2 to its intended goals, while preventing the internet from 
circumventing laws that were implemented before the concept of the 
internet was conceived. 
Over the past five decades, the wide-ranging principles of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, which began as a law for consumers and 
producers, have been replaced by a narrower school of thought, limiting 
 
 148  See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2019); see generally, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 
(D.C. Cir. 2001).  
 149  See, 1-9 LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS §9.02 (2nd ed. 2017). 
 150   1 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE 
REGULATION § 9.02 (2nd ed., 2017) 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. 
 153  Id. 
 154  Id.  
 155  Thomas A. Piraino Jr., Reconciling the Harvard and Chicago Schools: A New 
Antitrust Approach for the 21st Century, 82 IND. L.J. 346, 348-49 (2007). 
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the scope of the once-all-encompassing law.156  In their declawing of the 
Sherman Act, the judicial system has created a climate which allows 
issues such as Google’s search biases to slip through the cracks.  By 
returning to this previous model, advocated by such groups as the “New 
Brandeis” academic movement, the courts can take action against the 
unlawful growth of corporate giants, including Google’s unfair 
movement into the price comparison market on the back of its search 
engine’s success.157 
The original text of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act firmly 
placed focus on the actions of the provider, stating: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, 
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, 
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by 
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.158 
In a work published by the libertarian Cato Institute, antitrust 
scholars William Letwin and Hans Thorelli argue that “the passage of the 
Sherman Act was motivated by widespread hostility toward monopoly–
considered to be detrimental to the interests of consumers and small 
business and also antithetical to democratic institutions.”159  For a 
majority of the statute’s history, courts stood firm in decisions made 
under the Act by protecting both consumers and businesses.160  Even the 
actions deemed illegal can be beneficial to consumers.161  In his 
examination of this court philosophy, dubbed the “Harvard” school of 
antitrust theory, Professor Thomas A. Piraino provides examples of this 
line of decision-making in cases where antitrust violations are found 
despite being a net-benefit to consumers.162  One of the most direct 
examples of this school of thought can be seen in Judge Learned Hand’s 
opinion in United States v. Aluminum Company of America (“Alcoa”), 
 
 156  Id. at 346-47. 
 157  David Dayen, This Budding Movement Wants to Smash Monopolies, THE 
NATION (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/this-budding-movement-
wants-to-smash-monopolies/. 
 158  15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
 159  Robert L. Bradley Jr., On the Origins of the Sherman Antitrust Act, CATO 
INSTITUTE,  https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/ 
1990/1/cj9n3-13.pdf (last viewed Feb. 2, 2019) (emphasis added). 
 160  Piraino, supra note 155, at 348-49. 
 161  Id. 
 162  Id. 
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before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.163 
In Alcoa, the defendant, a company that engaged in the production 
of both raw and finished goods made from iron, was sued for violating 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, having amassed what its 
competitors argued was a monopoly over the market.164  Owning more 
than 80% of its market share, the court found that several of the 
defendant’s actions, such as buying up water sources, driving its prices 
below the market prices, and purchasing companies for the purpose of 
keeping out competition, violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.165  In 
establishing its defense, particularly with regard to its ingot monopoly, 
Alcoa argued that the fostering of a business that provided low costs for 
its consumers and benefits for its investors was an overall positive 
venture.  Such benefits, defendant argued, could not amount to a violation 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.166  In his opinion Judge Hand recognized 
the importance of competition to the markets, asserting that “[m]any 
people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens 
initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy” for those holding the 
monopoly.167  In accordance with the importance of such competition, 
Judge Hand asserts that “[i]t is settled . . . that there are some contracts 
restricting competition which are unlawful, no matter how beneficent 
they may be; no industrial exigency will justify them; they are absolutely 
forbidden.”168  This decision, having been made by one of the most 
influential judges of the time, reflects the courts’ willingness to outlaw 
actions that negatively impacted competition regardless of the economic 
benefits.  The decision in Alcoa is one of the most famous early Sherman 
Act cases and would hold for much of the first eighty years of the Act’s 
existence.169 
Despite the balanced protection of competition and consumers, the 
“Harvard” school of thought would be replaced in the 1970s by a judicial 
movement known as the “Chicago” school of antitrust philosophy.170  In 
his article, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, Judge 
Robert Bork examined the main purpose behind the creation and 
 
 163  Id. at 349. 
 164  United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d. Cir. 1945). 
 165  Id. at 432-36.  
 166  Id. at 429. 
 167  Id. at 427. 
 168  Id. 
 169  See United States v. Phila Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (“A merger 
the effect of which ‘may be substantially to lessen competition’ is not saved because, 
on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be 
deemed beneficial”). 
 170  Piriano, supra note 155, at 350. 
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implementation of antitrust law.171  Bork asserted that “Congress 
intended the courts to implement . . . only that value we would today call 
consumer welfare . . . the policy the courts were intended to apply is the 
maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfaction.”172  Citing the 
decisions of Judge Learned Hand, including his Alcoa decision, Bork 
found that these rulings indicate that the Act was put in place to protect 
citizens from harm from corporations who use greed to limit consumer 
options, specifically referring to Judge Hand’s reference to the consumer 
as “helpless.”173 
Bork’s 1966 article and its argument would spark a revolution in 
thinking about the purpose and scope of antitrust law enforcement, 
furthered by some of the most influential circuit court judges of the last 
forty years including Judges Frank H. Easterbrook and Richard Posner of 
the Seventh Circuit.174  Judge Posner lays out the Chicago school 
ideology as one that is focused around the protection of those purchasing 
goods within the market.175  In his work, The Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis, Judge Posner asserts that actions such as selling goods below 
cost do not violate antitrust law, finding them to be an unsustainable 
business model that will eventually lead to a return to market competition 
after prices inevitably are raised.176  With such powerful judicial figures 
leading the charge, the Chicago school flourished as the 20th Century 
came to a close with the once Bork-led D.C. Circuit’s decision in 
Microsoft serving as a shining example of Chicago-style antitrust theory 
put to action.  As previously seen, the procompetitive benefits of 
Microsoft’s streamlining its products superseded the impact of 
competitive businesses in its marketplace, a decision that played a major 
role in the FTC’s decision not to pursue action against Google.177 
Despite the current move throughout the mid-1900s and early-2000s 
to the Chicago style and its most diehard backers, some prominent voices 
have begun pushing for a return to the Harvard school of thought, citing, 
among other things, the Chicago school’s inability to account for the rise 
in internet monopolies.  In an article for the Wall Street Journal, 
Economics correspondent, Greg Ip, compares the internet behemoths of 
Google, Facebook and Amazon to some of history’s most recognizable 
 
 171  Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & Econ. 7 
(1966). 
 172  Id. at 7. 
 173  Id. at 8. 
 174  Piriano, supra note 155, at 350. 
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REV. 925, 927 (1979). 
 176  Id. 
 177  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 74-75. 
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monopolies, Standard Oil and American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company.178  Google and its internet compatriots have a direct impact on 
the consumers of their products, unlike the companies that formed the 
purpose for the installation of the Sherman Act and its progeny.179  As Ip 
recognizes, Standard Oil and American Telegraph’s monopolization over 
products for sale on the marketplace led to impacts in other areas of the 
companies that were bad for consumers, even if the prices of their specific 
products, for example kerosene, did not rise themselves.180  When using 
Google, however, companies appearing on the website are charged per 
click, while everyday users pay nothing.181  In the face of such 
difficulties, “the probability of regulatory action—for now—looks low, 
largely because U.S. regulators have a relatively high bar to clear: Do 
consumers suffer?”182 
In making such a statement, Mr. Ip recognizes the ineffectiveness of 
the Chicago school, which has declawed antirust regulation by penalizing 
consumers.  Despite this pessimism, a return to the Harvard school of 
thought could be the change that Mr. Ip, among others, seeks to create a 
more inherently fair internet market that drives competition as Congress 
originally intended.  By returning to the Harvard school, companies 
across all industries will be required to act with fair competition in mind, 
as seen in Alcoa, rather than just consumer happiness.183  Movements 
such as the “New Brandeis” calling for a return to this style could reduce 
the barriers of entry imposed by Google by making them illegal, just as 
originally intended by the Sherman Antitrust Act.184 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As this Note shows, it is unlikely that existing American law will 
provide the FTC or any other regulatory agency with the ability to bring 
legal action against Google, or any other search engine, for its use of 
biased methods to benefit lateral businesses.  As Section 2 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act has been interpreted in previous cases, most notably the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Microsoft Corp., it appears that case law has 
remained deferential to a company’s decision to modify its design.  
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Combined with potential pro-competitive arguments for such biased 
results that could be used by nearly any search engine seeking to provide 
similarly biased results, a § 2 claim would likely not meet the threshold 
necessary to bring a successful claim against Google in federal court.  
Despite the ineffectiveness of current laws, the judicial system can play 
a key role in requiring neutrality in search results.  By meeting the 
original calling of the Sherman Act to protect markets as well as the 
consumers within them and in keeping with many holdings of antitrust 
cases throughout the first half of the 20th Century, the courts could create 
a climate that protects companies’ abilities to compete in markets that are 
controlled largely by one company. In doing so, the government can bring 
action against dominant companies who use their power positions in one 
market to take control of another, as Google did through Google 
Shopping.  By protecting competition, courts could eradicate such unfair 
market prices, in turn allowing more companies to compete for market 
shares, fostering competition that has been proven to bring about growth 
in markets more effectively than those controlled by single enterprises, 
and further benefiting both producers and purchasers in a market. 
 
